He describes how the Shia residents of the Eastern Province are treated as second-class citizens; but he makes it clear that they are also able to stage Shia ritual processions through the streets, and how their ayatollahs maintain networks of close relations with one another and with their Iranian counterparts that “allow for a certain independence from the state.” Some have opened hawzat, or theological colleges, including one for women.
Such open displays of Shia religiosity and autonomy make many a Wahhabi cleric writhe. In January, I went with my editor in chief from The Economist to Saudi Arabia to meet Mohammed bin Salman, a young, previously little-publicized royal, known to his courtiers as Mb S.
A spring festival in the south was shut down after prepubescent girls joined in a folkloric dance.
Mc Donald’s revamped its fast-food franchises, and renovated signs segregating their counters and seating areas by sex.
Yet through all of these recent books comes a nagging question: If Saudi Arabia really is the wellspring of and if it imposes, as it often does, an orthodox conformity, how, a century after its creation, does the kingdom these authors describe remain, as they also make clear, such a heterogeneous and nuanced place?
Each of the authors acknowledges the gap between the totalitarian ideal and the looser reality.
Having proven his conservative and repressive capabilities, Mb S tacked leftward.
Earlier this year, after the executions, he stripped the special unit of the morality police of its powers to arrest people and locked up popular preachers who dared challenge this change.
Toby Matthiesen recounts in The Other Saudis that, a few years after taking the eastern shores of the peninsula from the reeling Ottomans in 1913, Wahhabi clerics issued a fatwa obliging local Shias to convert to “true Islam.” In Hijaz, the western region that includes Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah, militant Wahhabi clerics and their followers ransacked the treasuries of the holy places in Mecca, lopped the dome off the House of the Prophet in Medina, and razed myriad shrines. In 1930, when the Wahhabi Brethren began raiding Iraq and Jordan and upsetting the region’s British overlords, Abdulaziz al-Saud, the modern state’s founder, reined them in, slaughtering the zealots by the hundred.
Afterward, the peninsula regained much of its old tempo.
Shia clerics applied their versions of Islamic law in the east.
Mohammed bin Salman’s treatment of domestic affairs seemed as headstrong as his treatment of foreign ones.
Apparently in return for sanctioning the youngster’s accumulation of power, the clerical establishment secured the dismissal of the country’s first female minister, appointed in laxer times by Abdullah, the late king.
Wahhabi forces loyal to the monarchy counterattacked, saved the al-Sauds, and retook the mosque. Thirty-five years later, foreign descriptions of Saudi Arabia remain for the most part remarkably bleak.